doodle wrote:
moral judgments are neither true nor false, since their role is not to state facts or to describe the way the world is, but to express emotions, desires or even commands. This (despite some waverings) was Russell's dominant view for the rest of his life, though it took him twenty-two years to develop a well worked-out version of the theory. He tended to call it subjectivism or ‘the subjectivity of moral values’ though it is nowadays known as non-cognitivism, expressivism or emotivism. He came to think that, despite their indicative appearance, moral judgments — at least judgments about what is good or bad in itself — are really in the optative mood. (A sentence is in the optative mood if it expresses a wish or a desire.) What ‘X is good’ means is ‘Would that everyone desired X!’. It therefore expresses, but does not describe, the speaker's state of mind, specifically his or her desires, and as such can be neither truth nor false, anymore than ‘Oh to be in England now that April's here!’ If I say ‘Oh to be in England now that April's here!’, you can infer that I desire to be in England now that April's here (since absent an intention to mislead, it is not the sort of thing I would say unless I desired to be in England and thought that April was here). But I am not stating that I desire to be in England, since I am not stating anything at all (except perhaps that April is here). (See RoE: 131-144/Religion and Science: ch. 9.) Although this was Russell's dominant view from 1913 until his death, he did not care for it very much. ‘I cannot see how to refute the arguments for the subjectivity of ethical values, but I find myself incapable of believing that all that is wrong with wanton cruelty is that I don't like it’ (RoE: 165/Papers 11: 310-11). It is not entirely clear what Russell took these overwhelming arguments to be. But one of them seems to have proceeded from a Moorean premise. Russell took Moore to have refuted naturalism, the view that although there are moral truths, nothing metaphysically out of the ordinary is required to make them true. Conversely Russell took Moore to have proved that if there were to be moral truths about which things were good or bad as ends rather than means, the truths in question would require spooky non-natural properties, of goodness, badness etc — quite unlike the ‘natural’ properties posited by science and commonsense - to make them true. In the supposed absence of such properties, he was driven to the conclusion that moral judgments (at least judgments about goodness and badness) were either all false or neither true nor false.
I sort of fall between NAP'ers and religious folks when it comes to ethics.
I don't think they can be proven, but I have FAITH that morality exists, or, more specifically, that some states of being are intrinsically better for people (and, to some degree, animals) that have the ability to perceive those states, and that I, as a being with moral agency AND moral significance (the latter of which I would like recognized), ought to seek to value that intrinsic value in others... perhaps not as if it were my own, but to some degree.
I think logic CAN help us with morality, but it can't prove it, as far as I've been able to tell. Even if there were a God, I would not take it on its face that "whatever God says is morally correct, is morally correct." I think that our ABILITY to have a moral compass and reason could put God in a position where he's simply a meglomaniac who needs constant recognition.... for instance, if there IS no God, and I created life from a test tube, and it was conscious life, I would not deem myself to have supreme moral authority over this being.
Yeah, we all have a lot of gut feelings, and like Kshartle, I don't think it's good to just stop there... I've read/thought about this a LOT! I just see no proof of morality. I have faith that it exists, because if it doesn't, the holocaust was no different that any other event where molecules are manipulated. I "refuse to believe" that this is the case. However, if I am to try to prove morality because of this "gut feeling," it certainly wouldn't lead me to "the NAP and nothing else."
If I saw a guy letting a girl drown in a shallow pool because his silk shirt was expensive, I would be disgusted with his moral center. If some guy called a black, 19 year-old ex-soldier who was badly burned and in a wheelchair a "ret@rded g!mp n!gger" (I tried to come up with the most infuriating situation possible... sorry to get graphic), I wouldn't consider his father immoral for beating that guy to a pulp. I mean just think about that.... if your son got called something like that in public... to his face... insulting in so many ways... Mother Theresa would shank that SOB.
I doubt very many anarcho-capitalists would feel much differently if actually put in that situation.
If we're going to keep thinking about something because our "gut" tells us that there's something more here, why do NAP'ers want to stop at the NAP? K has even admitted that there's something beyond morality (perhaps, "decency?) that he hadn't really thought about, when it comes to positive obligations and some of these gray areas. Well when NAP and other "gut feelings" collide, there are a lot of situations that I think NAP would lose (on a gut level). Perhaps that makes me immoral. Well... I am a statist pig, so that's probably already a given.

"Men did not make the earth. It is the value of the improvements only, and not the earth itself, that is individual property. Every proprietor owes to the community a ground rent for the land which he holds."
- Thomas Paine