I wouldn't be too critical of the author. He does get the basic message right: "it doesn't necessarily make sense to give up on a strategy for having a bad year or two."
Although I wouldn't call this a bad year. 2008 was a bad year: -37% return for the S&P 500; -57% from 10/2007 to 3/2009. In comparison, this year's -1.56% return (YMMV) is no big deal. Show me another portfolio that has such small draw-downs.
IMO the 10-year return is more important than the 1-year return, anyway. The PP's current 10-year CAGR is 6.89%, which is only slightly lower than the current 10-year CAGR of a Boglehead 60/40 portfolio (6.96%). This is the first year since 2007 that the PP's 10-year CAGR hasn't been significantly higher than the 60/40's 10-year CAGR. The PP's 10-year CAGR has been remarkably consistent for the past 20 years, ranging between 5.85% and 8.68%.
The author also correctly states, "It is prudent however to assess a strategy's future prospects." Harry Browne himself, in
Why the Best-Laid Investment Plans Usually Go Wrong, pointed out that investment strategies tend to stop working over time. It would not be valid to draw any conclusion from a single year's returns. But I wonder whether the model might be temporarily broken, until the Fed backs out of QE.
Finally, I am reminded of William Bernstein's prediction: "very few of [the HBPP's] new fans will have the long-term discipline to stick with it when two of its riskiest and least conventional components, long Treasuries and gold, underperform, as they inevitably must..." (
http://www.amazon.com/review/R20DI5V8YWKGZN/). From 1984 to 2001 the 60/40 portfolio's 10-year CAGR averaged over 13%, compared with 8.8% for the HBPP, with only slightly higher average volatility. In such a scenario, the HBPP would still not be broken, but it might be considered sub-optimal.