Wonk,
Below are comments about your interesting analogy...
Wonk wrote:
Think of it like this...
You, me and 8 other gyroscopic investing forum members are in a closed room with $100 in each of our wallets. We all have backpacks filled with cool stuff and unique skills to trade. Our economy starts to drag because moda can't pay his mortgage to Storm, who is the banker. Moda is torn because he really wants to buy stuff, but he also wants to keep his house. Ultimately, he makes a decision to stop paying...and feels much better. Storm is pissing his pants because he's got many more Modas out there.
Okay, stopping right here, isn't it important to know what the ratio is of the value of goods in our backpacks to money in our pockets? If I have $10,000 worth of goods in my backpack and $100 in my pocket it seems like it would be a lot different than if I have $10 worth of stuff in my backpack and $100 in my pocket.
Fearing trouble, the door busts open and in walks The Bernank.
If The Bernank is walking
into our room that suggests he was previously in
another room. I think that the analogy would be more accurate if we assumed that The Bernank was in our room all along.
Storm pleads his case, The Bernank says he'll accept Moda's garbage note at par from Storm. Storm stays solvent, Moda is out from under the debt and can now spend money in our economy again.
But wait, if we assume The Bernank was in the room all along, doesn't that mean that we have just shuffled bad debt from one pocket to another within the same room?
Additionally, The Bernank agrees to buy the government's bonds in an effort to create inflation for all 10 of us and keep asset prices high.
But what is The Bernank buying the government bonds
with? Isn't it just IOUs based on future production from our room? In other words, all of the transactions have still only occurred in our room. We may feel better, but no new money has entered or exited our room. We now just have more future bills to pay.
Let's say he adds another $1000 of fresh cash to our room.
I assume you mean fresh
debt, no?
So we should have $2000 in cash to chase the same goods and services.
Yes, there is $2,000 more floating around the room, but isn't there also $2,000 more debt floating around the room as well? From a balance sheet perspective, aren't we in exactly the same position? We added a debit and a credit to our room's balance sheet in the same amounts.
Added to that, the government issues another $1000 in bonds and spends it on God knows what to stimulate economic activity. So now we're at $3,000.
What room was the government in? Presumably our room--if so, wouldn't that be the same balance sheet dynamic of adding $1,000 in new debt, which means $1,000 more floating around to spend, but another $1,000 claim on future production?
Prices should rise, right?
Why would prices rise if there is a drag on future consumption in the form of more debt to be paid off in the future? In other words, we may have more money today, but by definition we will have less money tomorrow because we will have to service the additional debt (including the interest), which will pinch future consumption and thus we might expect to see a short term surge in inflation, followed by a longer term deflation, sort of like what we saw in early 2008.
But wait a minute! Why aren't prices rising? It turns out Pkg Man is a retailer who sources product from China. He walks out of the room with $500 in cash, walks into the next room over and hands it to Mr. China. Mr. China accepts his cash, hands him new product and Pkg Man walks back into our room to sell his goods.
Pkg Man has some packages.
So.....what's going on in the next room over? Well, Mr. China is printing money like mad to buy up all of the new money coming over from Pkg Man in an effort to keep room #2's currency peg advantageous for exports back to our room #1. Turns out there's $100,000 worth of Bernank cash swirling around room #2, bidding up prices from commodities to labor. But in our room, we only see a few things going higher, while our assets continue to deflate.
Are prices of labor in China rising? How did The Bernank get in room #2? Isn't there every reason to believe that the same dynamics that have driven down asset prices in our room (i.e., easy credit, misallocated capital and overcapacity) also poised to drive down asset prices in room #2 in coming years?
Here's the kicker. There's a mountain of cash piled up in the room next door. For it to cause inflation, it has to find it's way back to our room. Will it? That's the million dollar question. The Bernank has committed to creating as much new cash is necessary to cause the inflation he wants. Will it be orderly or will the room next door get fed up and send all of that cash back quickly? Time will tell.
Isn't China in the identical position that Japan was in the late 1980s with enormous holdings of foreign currency and debt? Wasn't the U.S. in the same position in the late 1920s? When those situations unwound no one saw any inflation.
No doubt there are incredible deflationary headwinds. What matters is The Fed's willingness to create new money at any cost (buying questionable debt from both private and public balance sheets) and the willingness of investors to accept fresh debt from the government to overcome the private sector losses. If the will is lost in either case and the choice is to remove the floor, the party is over for asset prices. Then I accept the deflation thesis. If, however, the pedal stays on the metal, stagflation is a go and if not managed properly, a much worse scenario after that.
It still seems as if we are talking about spraying a fire hose into a tidal wave. It may mitigate the damage a bit, but the idea that the fire hose could
ever overcome the tidal wave is mistaking the strength of the opposing forces by orders of magnitude. What is The Bernank doing today that the Japanese central bank didn't do in the 1990s?
The key, to me, is whether the consumer is interested in levering up again. I don't think the consumer is in any kind of mood to get right back into debt. The reasons for this are many, but one of the strongest is the historic demographic shift we are seeing right now--people entering their golden years simply have much lower spending needs than they had when they were in their peak earning years with growing families. This dynamic alone is very deflationary (see Japan); when you add to the demographic shift the deflationary forces of credit contraction following a debt-based bubble bursting, you have a formidable deflationary one-two punch.
Note that every country in which we are seeing strong inflation right now has the opposite demographic situation that we have--they have TONS of young people relative to the oldsters, which translates into a very different consumption profile across those economies. Who has the largest demographic bulge of people entering their peak earning years right now? China, of course. Is it an accident that China also has the world's hottest economy right now? Nope.