Dets wrote:
Sorry if someone has already posted, but I thought this was interesting. In short, the author finds that T-Bills have actually been a great inflation hedge, energy and real estate were so-so, and TIPS and gold weren't very effective.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? ... id=2161124
Surprisingly good paper re. the data it presents.
Ang makes some surprising assumptions if you aren't expecting a Keynesian background. (I just love his commodity case where he follows the traditional approach in assuming that because the real world doesn't match the model, it is because of what was intentionally left out of the model rather than any invalid assumptions behind the model or causes/effects not even considered by the model.)
The other major flaw is related. The entire paper seems to assume that other factors affecting prices (of e.g. commodities or gold) are insignificant and thus they can be ignored when calculating the correlation with inflation, or else the effect of those factors ruins the correlation with inflation. I'm not sure which. Maybe I missed it, but it sure would have been nice to see spelled out which mistake he was making.
And I draw very different conclusions.
His conclusion is that because the return on T Bills correlates with inflation better than the other things he compared, even though that return lagged, that T Bills are a better hedge against inflation. He even identifies why -- inflation causes expectation of inflation and that causes investors to seek higher returns from their T Bills and the market, driven by investors, complies. He doesn't bother to point out the general trend of declining interest rates which give an advantage to T Bills, nor does he point out the problems with increasing authoritarian interference in the T Bill market which has resulted in negative real returns in 10 year bills even tho he pointed out similar in TIPS.
I would only make his conclusion in regards to one asset -- cash. For anything else, you should go after the better return. Why? The correlation he found is what I expected. It makes sense that the most liquid asset he tested, with the most direct and easy relationship to cash and inflation returns, has the highest (most direct) correlation with inflation. Any time you reduce liquidity compared to the ideal you are going to reduce correlation by an amount proportional to the change in liquidity. This is why closed-end funds trade at a premium or discount (see GTU) to their underlying securities and why ETFs typically do not. And when ETFs do trade offset, it is due to liquidity differences.
Edit: Got distracted, didn't finish my thought there. The correlation he found is the basis behind his conclusion. In other words, he assumes that higher correlation means a better hedge. But you had to expect that correlation just knowing the nature of the markets and assets he compared. So to go deeper than the obvious, you have to ask yourself, better hedge than what?
Edit continued: Obviously better than cash which has no hedge at all. But once you are talking about other assets with better returns, correlation suddenly becomes less important even if it has any relevance at all. Why would you wait months or years to be compensated for inflation (as in T Bills with their better correlation) when you could be compensated more, or sooner or even in advance by better returns? I'm not as interested in exactly offsetting inflation by a known amount as I am in generating a better return. And in Ang's model, a better return is worse because the correlation is less -- it does not move the same direction by the same amount as inflation.
Anyway, good data. Good overview of traditional economic thought. Scholarly papers that go beyond presenting data are always such a load of crap.