Re: Why the Allies Won
Posted: Wed Jul 07, 2021 2:33 pm
I'll make this a separate post but it's related.
This is sort of a timely thread as I've been reading the memoirs of German generals from the first and second world wars...mainly the headline guys so to speak. A couple of months back I finished up Heinz Guderian's. Very fascinating to read their accounts and of course their spin. He made some interesting points about Hitler.
Hitler did have a certain talent militarily and he was very hard to refute after 1940 because he had basically been right about everything politico-militarily through the previous decade minus. However, Guderian said that Hitler just did not pick up on critical details (minutiae) nor their implications that a highly seasoned/experienced general did. And, because he wouldn't listen several not great decisions were made. Guderian makes the point that strategically Germany blew it on the eastern front in the summer of 1942. Basically took on too much in too many places and it was all down hill from there.
Another point he made was that Hitler was an unmitigated disaster when it came to waging defensive warfare...eventually disagreements in this phase of the war got Guderian fired, but not shot.
Finally, in his writing it's apparent the German high command was dysfunctional and did not work together well.
Side note: In reading the German generals' stuff there is one thing that has been a really strong thread that I've way underappreciated previously. It is very clear that they really did focus on their troops and their welfare. I've known this intellectually, but as I've read both senior and junior German participants' memoirs in both wars it really comes through and is distinctively different than US and Allied writings. Not that you don't see this in Allied memoirs, but my sense is the above was much more systemically inculcated in the German armies.
This is sort of a timely thread as I've been reading the memoirs of German generals from the first and second world wars...mainly the headline guys so to speak. A couple of months back I finished up Heinz Guderian's. Very fascinating to read their accounts and of course their spin. He made some interesting points about Hitler.
Hitler did have a certain talent militarily and he was very hard to refute after 1940 because he had basically been right about everything politico-militarily through the previous decade minus. However, Guderian said that Hitler just did not pick up on critical details (minutiae) nor their implications that a highly seasoned/experienced general did. And, because he wouldn't listen several not great decisions were made. Guderian makes the point that strategically Germany blew it on the eastern front in the summer of 1942. Basically took on too much in too many places and it was all down hill from there.
Another point he made was that Hitler was an unmitigated disaster when it came to waging defensive warfare...eventually disagreements in this phase of the war got Guderian fired, but not shot.
Finally, in his writing it's apparent the German high command was dysfunctional and did not work together well.
Side note: In reading the German generals' stuff there is one thing that has been a really strong thread that I've way underappreciated previously. It is very clear that they really did focus on their troops and their welfare. I've known this intellectually, but as I've read both senior and junior German participants' memoirs in both wars it really comes through and is distinctively different than US and Allied writings. Not that you don't see this in Allied memoirs, but my sense is the above was much more systemically inculcated in the German armies.