Gumby wrote:
It is well known that Treasury Bonds have virtually zero credit risk. After all, that is why we hold them in our PP. But, why do you suppose they have virtually zero credit risk is if we can't print money to pay our bills? The way you describe it, there should be a LOT of credit risk — since we could conceivably run out of money if Congress was gridlocked.
And you'd think that Treasury yields would reflect the risk of a Congressional gridlock. But they don't. Even with the debt ceiling potentially not being raised, the bond market still seems to see T-Bonds as having virtually zero credit risk. 4 week Treasury Bills are currently being auctioned off at
0.000%. And those bonds mature on August 4th (2 days after we supposedly default)!
I'm not sure I see how we can say that T-Bonds have virtually no credit risk in one breath and then say that the Treasury could run out of money in the next breath. That doesn't make sense to me.
Gumby --
As I said, the Treasury CAN print dollar banknotes. So technically there is no credit risk. But they can't do it indefinitely. Despite many practical legal and logistical problems (only a few of which I mentioned), they could probably find some way to create dollar banknotes to meet obligations for a period of time. The problem is how long and the conditions that would likely result. If the Treasury could simply print money, the debt ceiling would be irrelevant.
Until Congress acts, whether it's to raise the debt ceiling or perhaps craft some other acceptable guarantees that obligees of the USG will ultimately be made whole (which seems unlikely), the situation will be inherently unstable and will become increasingly unsustainable. Unless net Treasury debt issuances immediately become flat or decline (or, put another way, USG tax and other income immediately equals or exceeds legally due USG expenditures), every short-term "solution" will very quickly become a new problem. I say it will happen very quickly because most of the "easy" short-term solutions (like Treasury borrowings from existing Trust funds and the short-term juggling of discretionary payment obligations) are being exhausted as we converse.
As in any unstable economic situation, exactly how it unfolds in the marketplace is unpredictable. IMHO, the most important market to watch is the currency (and, by extension, gold) market, not the debt market. The currency markets are far less distorted by routine government or central bank activities. Right now, participants in the equity, credit and currency markets are viewing (probably correctly) all of this stuff as political theater. If that sentiment starts shifting, the term "market volatility" (up and down) will take on a new meaning for this generation of investors.
In other words, there is no "credit" risk in dollar-denominated Treasury securities, but there is certainly "dollar" risk.
The dollars in circulation now -- Federal Reserve notes and demand deposits -- are legal tender in the US and are obligations backed by the Federal Reserve System (the FED). In short, dollars are entries on the right hand side of the Fed's balance sheet. They arise from the Fed's purchase of the assets (mostly USG obligations) that grace the left hand side of the FED's balance sheet. The Treasury could begin to print all the new legal tender "dollars" they want, but unless they are explicitly backed by some body (like a credible and solvent central bank, or a political pledge like "the full faith and credit of the United States"), or some thing (like gold or silver or some other transferable asset), they will have little to no value to people outside of the US. Even banana republic currencies have an explicit backing, usually of a central bank stuffed full of bogus assets.
A best case scenario in the event Congress takes no action of any kind: The practical and legal problems of physical currency movements are overcome and nobody domestically or internationally notices (or chooses to question) that the Treasury is printing and spending the obligations of a very different intstitution, i.e., the FED. At best, this scenario could only last until the net new Treasury debt issuances exceed the FED's existing equity (i.e., how much its assets exceed its liabilities) and the FED becomes insolvent.
I don't have the figures in front of me, but I know the FED's balance sheet is leveraged something like 45 to 1. The FED could independently delay the insolvency for a period, but only by buying the existing (and now shrinking) stock of Treasury obligations outstanding with newly created money. (Buying non-Treasury obligations would only increase the leverage.) However the situation were to play out, the effects on interest rates (both up and down, real and nominal) would be monumental. Even this could not go on forever, however, as the supply of Treasury obligations would eventually dry up. The twists and turns while all this played out are impossible to predict, but ultimately it would probably end in something rivaling the 1930's.
A conceivable variation: The Treasury issues some other kind of legal tender fiat dollar banknotes. But it can't issue "United States Notes" or similar obligations (like the original greenbacks in the 1860's) backed by a USG political pledge or promise of some kind without violating the debt ceiling. What other kind of fiat dollar banknote could be issued?
Another conceivable variation: The Treasury might be able to issue gold or silver certificates again, but the bullion backing would have to extend to the whole worldwide stock of dollars in existence in order to achieve fungibility. Implementation of this without Congressional participation and/or approval is inconceivable to me.
At any rate, I'm sure there are far more scenarios or possibilities than I could ever come with but I doubt any of them would ever prove practical or sustainable. It seems clear that right now that the marketplace is confident Congress will take some kind of remedial action before we fall into the abyss. I hope (and expect) they are right, but I do fear we might tread too close before the idealogues on one side or the other realize it. We desparately need tax and spending, and possibly monetary, reforms but not by Congressional inaction on the debt ceiling.
I don't consider any of the above musings inconsistent with HB's writings. They only reinforce the logic of having a permanent portfolio. HB did say the USG could print money (whether directly or through debt creation), but he never said or implied it could be done indefinitely without consequence.
Sorry, I didn't mean to ramble on. I am tired of writing. Like those of everyone else, these hypotheticals are only opinions.